Published November 1979 — Download PDF of the original newspaper column
Byrd's-Eye View By U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd The Benefits of SALT II For several months, I have studied the SALT II Treaty and related issues to determine whether the treaty, as written, is in our national interests. After reviewing the treaty text, extensive committee hearings transcripts, and the Senate Intelligence Committee's report, I have concluded that the SALT II Treaty benefits the United States’ national interest. Briefly, the reasons for my decision are: -SALT II leaves the U.S. free to develop strategic weapons needed for our own security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that no planned American strategic or theater nuclear weapons system is inhibited by SALT II; -Without the treat, the U.S. would face unrestrained arms competition, which would drain funds needed to strengthen our conventional forces and the theater nuclear forces in Europe; -SALT II will leave the U.S. free to continue to collaborate with our allies in the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear forces, and to consider arms control initiatives in that area; -The treaty provides significant arms control by limiting each side on the number of Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV's) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's), and Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBM's); -The treaty is adequately verifiable, and does not rely on trust. The treaty prohibits interference with national technical means of verification or any deliberate concealment measures which impeded verification of compliance with treaty provisions; -the treaty prohibits Soviet testing, production or development of SS-16, a mobile ICBM. Soviet production of the Backfire bomber is also limited by agreement. During the almost seven years of negotiations on SALT II-under both Republican and Democratic administrations-the Soviets made several concessions. If the treaty negotiations were to be reopened, as some people suggest, the Soviets would want to renegotiate these concessions. It is likely that the resulting treaty would be less favorable to the U.S., or, even more probably, there would be no treaty at all. The Soviets also could develop and deploy weapons that are banned under SALT II, while the treaty was being renegotiated. Our European allies strongly support the treaty, and rejection of it could raise serious questions about U.S. stability and leadership. The cohesiveness of the Western alliance would be undermined. Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty would not mean that we are doing the Russians a favor, nor does it imply approval of the Soviets or their system of government. Ratification is desirable because the treaty is in our own interest, and would contribute to our national security. November 7, 1979. -